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Abstract
The stochastic interpretation of Parikh’s game logic should not follow the usual pattern of
Kripke models, which in turn are based on the Kleisli morphisms for the Giry monad, rather,
a specific and more general approach to probabilistic nondeterminism is required. We outline
this approach together with its probabilistic and measure theoretic basis, introducing in a
leisurely pace the Giry monad and their Kleisli morphisms together with important techniques
for manipulating them. Proof establishing specific techniques are given, and pointers to the
extant literature are provided.
After working through this tutorial, the reader should find it easier to follow the original
literature in this and related areas, and it should be possible for her or him to appreciate
measure theoretic arguments for original work in the areas of Markov transition systems, and
stochastic effectivity functions.
∗Some of the results were obtained while the author held the Chair for Software Technology at Technische Uni-
versita¨t Dortmund; they were funded in part by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Koalgebraische Eigenschaften
stochastischer Relationen, grant DO 263/12-1.
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1 Objectives
A minimal categorial framework is introduced in order to formulate coalgebras and monads (which
come here in their disguise as Kleisli tripels). We specialize then to the category of measurable
spaces, discussing here in particular the Giry monad, with occasional side glances to the upper
closed functor. This is complemented by a discussion of morphisms for stochastic coalgebras (which
will also be used for the interpretation of various modal logics), giving among others congruences,
which will be put to use when discussing the expressivity of Kripke models. But before doing so,
we have a fairly general look at bisimulations for various transition models, pointing at difficulties
arising for stochastic coalgebras. We expand then our scenario by introducing stochastic effectivity
functions, which we will briefly investigate, and which will be used for an interpretation of game
logics.
Not all topics can be treated in depth due to limitations in space, but proofs are provided here
and there, mostly for illustrating some techniques. Two appendices are provided, one discusses
a technical device (the Souslin operation), the other one gives the important π-λ-Theorem from
Boolean σ-algebras.
The classic reference to coalgebras is the paper by Rutten [21], the survey paper by Venema [26]
focusses on representation issues, see also [15]. The present discussion is based on [9, 8, 10].
References to extant pieces of literature are given when needed.
2 Coalgebras
Fix a category C with an endofunctor F (I assume that the reader knows what a category is, and
what a functor does).
Definition 2.1 An F-coalgebra (a, f) over C is an object a of C together with a morphism Coalgebra
f : a→ Fa.
Example 2.2 Let C be the category of sets with maps as morphisms, the functor is the power
set functor 2−. (A, f) is an 2−-coalgebra iff f : A → 2A is a map. This is in 1-1-correspondence
with binary relations:
Category of
sets
〈x, x ′〉 ∈ R iff x ′ ∈ f(x).
Through this, transition systems are studied. ✌
Example 2.3 Let X resp. Y be the inputs and the outputs of an automaton with outputs. Define Automata
F := (−× Y)X over the category of sets. The (A, f) is an F-coalgebra iff it is an automaton with
states A: Since f : A→ (A× Y)X, we have f(a)(x) ∈ A× Y, say, f(a)(x) = 〈a ′, y〉, hence a ′ is the
new state of the automaton, y its output upon input x in state a.
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Conversely, let (X, Y,A, δ) be an automaton with output, i.e., δ : A×X→ A×Y is a map. Currying
gives a map f : A→ (A× Y)X through f(a)(x) := δ(a, x). This means that f is an F-coalgebra. ✌
Example 2.4 Put FA := {∗}∪A×A with ∗ a new symbol. (A, f) is an F-coalgebra iff f corresponds Trees
to a binary tree over A. Put f(a) := ∗ iff a is a leaf, and f(a) = 〈a1, a2〉 iff a1 and a2 are offsprings
of a. The tree may be infinite, though. ✌
Fix in what follows both C and F.
Definition 2.5 Let (a1, f1) and (a2, f2) be F-coalgebras. A C-morphism ϕ : a1 → a2 is a
coalgebra morphism (a1, f1)→ (a2, f2) iff f2 ◦ϕ = Fϕ ◦ f1. This means that the diagram
Coalgebra
morphism
a1
f1

ϕ // a2
f2

Fa1
Fϕ
// Fa2
commutes.
Proposition 2.6 F-coalgebras form a category with coalgebra morphisms as morphisms; compo-
sition is inherited from C. ⊣
Example 2.7 Consider the coalgebras corresponding to transition systems from Example 2.2.
Then ϕ : (A1, f1)→ (A2, f2) is a coalgebra morphisms iff these conditions are satisfied:
1. a ′1 ∈ f1(a1) implies ϕ(a
′
1) ∈ f2(a1).
2. If a ′2 ∈ f2(ϕ(a1)), then there exists a
′
1 ∈ f1(a1) with ϕ(a
′
1) = a
′
2.
In fact, assume that ϕ is a coalgebra morphism. Then we note that 2ϕ(W) = ϕ
[
W
]
, and that
we have this commuting diagram
A1
f1

ϕ // A2
f2

2A1
22ϕ
// 2A2
Assume that a ′1 ∈ f(a1), then
ϕ(a ′1) ∈ ϕ
[
f1(a1)
]
= 2ϕ(f1(a1)) = f2(ϕ(a1)).
This gives us the first condition. On the other hand, let a ′2 ∈ f2(ϕ(a1)) = 2
ϕ(f1(a1)), thus
a ′2 ∈ ϕ
[
f1(a1)
]
. But this implies that we can find a ′1 ∈ f1(a1) with ϕ(a
′
1) = a
′
2. This provides
us with the second condition. The converse direction offers itself as an exercise.
These morphisms are called bounded morphisms in the theory of transition systems. In fact,
Bounded
morphisms
reformulate a ′ ∈ f1(a) as a →1 a ′, similarly b ′ ∈ f2(b) as b →2 b ′. In this notation, the
conditions above read
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1. a1 →1 a ′1 implies ϕ(a1)→2 ϕ(a ′1).
2. If ϕ(a1)→2 a ′2, then there exists a ′1 with a1 →1 a ′1 such that ϕ(a ′1) = a ′2.
This indicates an interesting connection between coalgebras and transition systems. ✌
Example 2.8 Take the functor EE of all upper closed subsets of 2−. We did not yet define how
Upper
closed
EE acts on maps, hence we have to transform f : A→ B to EE(f) : EE(A)→ EE(B). Let’s see how to
do this.
Let G ∈ EE(A), then G ⊆ 2A is upper closed. Thus the set {H ⊆ B | f−1
[
H
]
∈ G} ⊆ 2B is also
upper closed (if H1 ⊆ H2 and f−1
[
H1
]
∈ G, we note that f−1
[
H1
]
⊆ f−1
[
H2
]
, and since G is
upper closed, this implies that f−1
[
H2
]
∈ G). With this in mind, we put
EE(f)(G) := {H ⊆ B | f−1
[
H
]
∈ G}.
It can be shown that EE(g ◦ f) = EE(g) ◦ EE(f) (see [9, 2.3.14]).
What do morphisms for EE look like? Let’s try:
A1
f1

ϕ // A2
f2

EE(A1)
EE(ϕ)
// EE(A2)
Let H = f2(ϕ(a1)) =
(
EE(ϕ) ◦ f1
)
(a1), thus
H ∈ H iff H ∈ EE(ϕ)
(
f1(a1)
)
iff ϕ−1
[
H
]
∈ f1(a1).
Consequently we have
f2(ϕ(a1)) = {H ⊆ B | ϕ
−1
[
H
]
∈ f1(a1)}
as a qualifying condition for ϕ : A1 → A2 to become a EE-morphism. ✌
3 The $-Functor
Before entering the a discussion on the probability functor, we need to know a little bit more about
measurable spaces. Recall that a measurable space (X,A) is a set X together with a Boolean σ-
algebra A on X, the σ indicating here that the Boolean algebra is closed under countable unions
(and, by implication, under countable intersections).
Definition 3.1 Let X be a set, A ⊆ 2X be a family of subsets of X. Then σ(A)
σ(A) :=
⋂
{B | A ⊆ B,B is a σ− algebra}
is the smallest σ-algebra on X which contains A. A is called a generator of σ(A).
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It is clear that σ(A) is always a σ-algebra (check the properties). Also, A ⊆ 2X, the latter one
being a σ-algebra. Note that σ : 2X → 2X is a closure operator, thus we have
• if A ⊆ B, then σ(A) ⊆ σ(B),
• A ⊆ σ(A),
• σ(σ(A)) = σ(A). In particular, σ(A) = A, whenever A is a σ-algebra.
Example 3.2 The Borel sets B(R) are defined as the smallest σ-algebra on R which contains the Borel sets
open (or the closed) sets. We claim that
B(R) = σ
({
[r,+∞[| r ∈ R}) =: Q.
In fact
• Q ⊆ B(R), since
[r,+∞[= ⋂n∈N]r − 1n ,∞[,
the latter sets are in B(R), since they are open.
• [r, s[∈ Q for r < s, since [r, s[= [r,∞[\[s,∞[.
• ]r, s[∈ Q, since ]r, s[=
⋃
n∈N[r + 1/n, s[.
• All open sets in R are in Q, because each open set can be written as the union of countably
many open intervals (and the open intervals are in Q).
• All closed sets are in Q as well, since Q is closed under complementation. Hence B(R) ⊆ Q.
✌
The reals R are always assumed to have the Borel σ-algebra. In what follows, we will usually
write down measurable spaces without their σ-algebras, unless we have to.
Definition 3.3 Let (X,A) and (Y,B) be measurable spaces. A map f : X → Y is called A-B-
measurable iff f−1
[
B
]
∈ A for all B ∈ B. Measurability
Note the similarity to continuity (inverse images of open sets are open is the general definition),
and to uniform continuity (resp. inverse images of neighborhoods are neighborhoods). Note also
that a measurable map is not necessarily a Boolean homomorphism of the Boolean algebras A and
B (constant maps are always measurable, but are rarely homomorphisms of Boolean algebras).
We should convince ourselves that we did indeed create a category.
Proposition 3.4 Measurable spaces with measurable maps form a category.
Proof We need only to show: if f : X → Y and g : Y → Z are measurable, so is g ◦ f : X → Z.
Let A, B, and C be the corresponding σ-algebras, then we obtain from the measurability of g that
g−1
[
C
]
∈ B for C ∈ C, thus f−1
[
g−1
[
C
]]
∈ A, since f is also measurable. But (g◦f)−1 = f−1◦g−1,
so the assertion follows. ⊣
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This is a helpful criterion for measurability, since it permits testing only on a generator, which is
usually more readily available than the whole σ-algebra.
Lemma 3.5 Let (X,A) and (Y,B) be measurable spaces, f : X → Y a map, and assume that B is
generated by B0. Then f is A-B-measurable iff f−1
[
B
]
∈ A for all B ∈ B0.
Proof 1. The condition is clearly necessary for measurability, since B0 ⊆ B.
2. The criterion is also sufficient. We show this through the principle of good sets (see [9, Remark
Principle of
good sets
after Theorem 1.6.30]). It works like this. We want to show that f−1
[
B
]
∈ A holds for all B ∈ B.
Consider the set G of all “good sets”,
G := {B ⊆ Y | f−1
[
B
]
∈ A}.
Then
1. G is a σ-algebra. This is so because f−1 is compatible with all the Boolean operations, e.g.,
f−1
[⋃
i∈I Bi
]
) =
⋃
i∈I f
−1
[
Bi
]
.
2. B0 ⊆ G by assumption.
Thus
σ(B0) ⊆ σ(G) = G.
Hence B = σ(B0) ⊆ G, but this means that f−1
[
B
]
∈ A for all B ∈ B. Hence f is in fact
A-B-measurable. ⊣
This is an easy consequence from Lemma 3.5 together with Example 3.2:
Lemma 3.6 A map f : X→ R is measurable iff {x ∈ x | f(x) ≥ r} is a measurable subset of X for
all r ∈ R. ⊣
Note that we can replace the sets {f ≥ r} by {f ≤ r}, by {f > r} or by {f < r}, since there are
easy ways to compute one through the other using only countable operations (such as {f > r} =⋃
n∈N{f ≥ r + 1/n}), and so on.
Example 3.7 Let χA be the indicator function of A ⊆ X, thus
Indicator
function
χA(x) := if x ∈ A then 1 else 0 fi.
Then χA is a measurable function iff A is a measurable set. This becomes evident from
{x ∈ X | χA(x) ≥ r} =


∅, r > 1,
A, 0 < r ≤ 1,
X, r ≤ 0
✌
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A measurable space induces a measurable structure on the space
$ (X) := {µ | µ is a probability on (the σ-algebra of) X}
in the following way. Define first
β(A,q) := {µ ∈ $ (X) | µ(A) ≥ q}
as the set of measures the value of which at event A is not smaller than q.
Definition 3.8 Given a measurable space X, its *-σ-algebra is the smallest σ-algebra on $ (X) *-σ-algebra
which contains the sets {β(A,q) | A ⊆ X measurable, q ∈ R}.
Thus the *-σ-algebra is the smallest σ-algebra on $ (X) which produces measurable maps from the
evaluation at events.
Example 3.9 Define for the measurable space X the embedding ηX : X → $ (X) upon setting
ηX(x)(A) := χA(x). Then ηX is a measurable map. In fact, by Lemma 3.5 and the definition of
the *-σ-algebra we have to show that the set
ηX
−1
[
β(A,q)
]
= {x ∈ X | ηX(x) ∈ β(A,q)}
is measurable for each measurable set A ⊆ X and each q ∈ R. But we have
ηX(x) ∈ β(A,q) iff χA(x) ≥ q,
so that the set in question is measurable by Example 3.7. η is usually called the Dirac kernel,
ηX(x) the Dirac measure on x ∈ X, which is usually denoted by δx, when the measurable space X
is understood.
Reformulating, we see that ηX : X→ $X is a morphism in the category of measurable spaces. ✌
We define now $ for a measurable map and show that this yields a measurable map again. This
is the basis for
1. showing that $ is an endofunctor on the category of measurable spaces,
2. establishing the properties of the Giry monad.
Allora:
Definition 3.10 Let X and Y be measurable spaces, f : X → Y be a measurable map. Define for
µ ∈ $ (X) and for B ⊆ Y measurable
$ (f) (µ)(B) := µ
(
f−1
[
B
])
.
This is called the image measure for µ under f.
Image
measure
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The first step towards showing that $ is an endofunctor consists in showing that $ transforms
measurable maps into measurable maps again (albeit on another space).
Lemma 3.11 Given X, Y and f as above, $ (f) : $ (X) → $ (Y) is measurable with respect to the
*-σ-algebras.
Proof 0. We have to establish first that ($f)(µ) is a measure on Y, provided µ ∈ $X. This is
fairly straightforward, let’s have a look:
1. $ (f) (µ)(∅) = µ(f−1
[
∅
]
) = µ(∅) = 0, and $ (f) (µ)(Y) = µ(f−1
[
Y
]
) = µ(X) = 1.
2. Let A and B be disjoint measurable subsets of Y, then f−1
[
A
]
and f−1
[
B
]
are disjoint as
well, thus
$ (f) (µ)(A ∪ B) = µ(f−1
[
A ∪ B
]
)
= µ(f−1
[
A
]
∪ f−1
[
B
]
)
= µ(f−1
[
A
]
) + µ(f−1
[
B
]
)
= $ (f) (µ)(A) + $ (f) (µ)(B).
3. If (Bn)n∈N is an increasing sequence of measurable sets in Y with B :=
⋃
n∈N Bn, then(
f−1
[
Bn
])
n∈N
is an increasing sequence of measurable subsets of X, and f−1
[
B
]
equals⋃
n∈N f
−1
[
Bn
]
, thus
$ (f) (µ)(B) = µ(f−1
[
B
]
) = sup
n∈N
µ(f−1
[
Bn
]
) = sup
n∈N
$ (f) (µ)(Bn).
1. We establish measurability by showing that the inverse image of a generator to the *-σ-algebra
in Y is a *-σ-measurable subset of $ (X). Then the assertion will follow from Lemma 3.5. In fact,
let B ⊆ Y be measurable, then we claim that
($f)−1
[
βY(B, q)
]
= βX(f
−1
[
B
]
, q)
holds. This is so because
µ ∈ ($f)−1
[
βY(B, q)
]⇔ $ (f) (µ) ∈ βY(B, q)
⇔ $ (f) (µ)(B) ≥ q
⇔ µ(f−1[B]) ≥ q
⇔ µ ∈ βX(f−1[B], q).
⊣
This yields as an immediate consequence
Proposition 3.12 $ is an endofunctor on the category of measurable spaces. ⊣
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4 The Giry Monad
We want to determine the coalgebras for $. Given a measurable space X, a $-coalgebra (X,K)
is a measurable map K : X → $X. It will be necessary to proceed a bit more general, and to
characterize measurable maps X→ $ (Y) first.
Example 4.1 Let X and Y be measurable spaces, and K : X → $ (Y) be a measurable map
(remember: $ (Y) carries the *-σ-algebra). Thus
1. K(x) is for every x ∈ X a probability measure on (the measurable subsets of) Y.
2. Since K−1
[
βY(B, q)
]
= {x ∈ X | K(x)(B) ≥ q}, we see that the map x 7→ K(x)(B) is measur-
able for any fixed measurable set B ⊆ Y.
Conversely, if we know that x 7→ K(x)(B) is measurable for any fixed measurable set B ⊆ Y, and
that K(x) is always a probability measure on Y, then the identity
K−1
[
βY(B, q)
]
= {x ∈ X | K(x)(B) ≥ q}
shows that K is a measurable map X→ $Y.
Thus we have in particular identified the coalgebras (X,K) for the $-functor as maps K : X×A→
Coalgebras
for $
[0, 1] such that
1. K(x) is a probability measure on X,
2. x 7→ K(x)(A) is a measurable map for each measurable set A.
(here A is the σ-algebra on X). K is also known in probabilistic circles as a Markov kernel or
a transition probability. In terms of transition systems: K(x)(A) is the probability of making a
transition from x to an element of the measurable set A. ✌
Example 4.2 We identify the morphisms for these coalgebras now. Let (X,K) and (Y, L) be $-
coalgebras. A morphism ϕ for these coalgebras must be a measurable map ϕ : X → Y, which is
compatible with the coalgebraic structure. This means in our case that
X
K

ϕ // Y
L

$X
$ϕ
// $Y
commutes. Thus
L(ϕ(x))(B) =
(
L ◦ϕ
)
(x)(B) =
(
$ (ϕ) ◦ K
)
(x)(B) = $ (ϕ) (K(x))(B) = K(x)(ϕ−1
[
B
]
),
meaning that the probability of hitting an element of B from ϕ(x) is the same as hitting an element
of ϕ−1
[
B
]
from x. ✌
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For proceeding further, we need the integral of a bounded measurable function. Having this at
our disposal, we can investigate the Giry monad and put it into context with other known monads
by identifying common properties.
Fix for the moment a measurable space X with σ-algebra A.
Definition 4.3 Denote by F(X,A) = F(X) the set of all bounded measurable functions on X.
The algebraic structure of F(X) is easily identified.
Lemma 4.4 F(X) is a real vector space with χA ∈ F(X) iff A ∈ A.
Proof 0. We know already from Example 3.7 that χA constitutes a measurable function iff the
set A is measurable.
1. It is sufficient to show that F(X) is closed under addition and under scalar multiplication. The
latter property is fairly easy established through Lemma 3.6, so let’s try our hand on the sum.
We have for r ∈ R and f, g ∈ F(X)
{x ∈ X | f(x) + g(x) < r} =
⋃
q∈Q,q<r
{x ∈ X | f(x) + g(x) < q}
=
⋃
q∈Q,q<r
( ⋃
a1,a2∈Q,a1+a2≤q
(
{x | f(x) < a1} ∩ {x | g(x) < a2}
))
Because both {x | f(x) < a1} and {x | g(x) < a2} are measurable sets, it follows that {x ∈
X | f(x) + g(x) < r} is a measurable set, since Q is countable. The assertion now follows from
Lemma 3.6. ⊣
It is also not difficult to show with the available tools that limn→∞ fn defines a member of F(X),
provided (fn)n∈N ⊆ F(X) such that |fn(x)| ≤ B for alln ∈ N and x ∈ X, where B ∈ R (the latter
condition is necessary for making the limit a bounded function).
This permits us to define the integral of a bounded measurable function. The elaborate process
is somewhat technical and drawn out in great detail in [9, Section 4.8]; we restrict ourselves to
presenting the result.
Proposition 4.5 Let µ ∈ $ (X) be a probability measure on X. There exists a unique map Φ :
F(X)→ R with these properties:
1. Φ(a · f+ b · g) = a ·Φ(f) + b ·Φ(g), whenever a, b ∈ R and f, g ∈ F(X) (linearity).
2. Φ(f) ≥ 0, provided f ≥ 0, hence Φ is monotone (positivity).
3. Φ(χA) = µ(A) for all measurable sets A ⊆ X (extension).
4. If (fn)n∈N is a sequence of bounded measurable functions such that the limit limn→∞ fn is
bounded, then
Φ( lim
n→∞
fn) = lim
n→∞
Φ(fn).
This is usually referred to as continuity.
⊣
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Notation: Φ(f) is written traditionally as
∫
X
f dµ, or as
∫
X
f(x) µ(dx), if we want to emphasize
∫
X
f dµ
the integration variable. We write
∫
A
f dµ for
∫
X
f · χA dµ. It is called the integral of f with
respect to µ.
Example 4.6 Let K : X→ $ (Y) be a measurable map for the measurable spaces X and Y. Define
for µ ∈ $ (X)
K∗(µ)(B) :=
∫
X
K(x)(B) µ(dx)
for B ⊆ Y measurable. Then K∗(µ)
1. K∗(µ) ∈ $Y,
2. µ 7→ K∗(µ) is a measurable map $ (X)→ $ (Y) with respect to the *-σ-algebras on $ (X) resp.
$ (Y).
We establish only the first property. The second one is not particularly difficult, but a bit more
time consuming to establish, so I refer you to [9, Example 2.4.8].
Let us have a look at the properties of a measure:
1. K∗(µ)(∅) =
∫
X
0 dµ = 0 and K∗(µ)(Y) =
∫
X
1 dµ =
∫
X
χX dµ = µ(X) = 1.
2. Let A and B are disjoint measurable sets in Y, then
K∗(µ)(A ∪ B) =
∫
X
K(x)(A ∪ B) µ(dx)
=
∫
X
(
K(x)(A) + K(x)(B)
)
µ(dx) (each K(x) is a measure)
=
∫
X
K(x)(A) µ(dx) +
∫
X
K(x)(B) µ(dx) (additivity of the integral)
= K∗(µ)(A) + K∗(µ)(B).
3. Assume that B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Bn ⊆ . . . is an increasing sequence of measurable sets in Y
with B :=
⋃
n∈N Bn, then
K(x)(B) = lim
n→∞
K(x)(Bn)
for all x ∈ X, since each K(x) is a measure, and 0 ≤ K(x)(B) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X, thus we obtain
from continuity
K∗(µ)(B) =
∫
X
K(x)(B) µ(dx)
=
∫
X
lim
n→∞
K(x)(Bn) µ(dx)
= lim
n→∞
∫
X
K(x)(Bn) µ(dx)
= lim
n→∞
K∗(µ)(Bn).
✌
August 27, 2018 E.-E. Doberkat
Page 12 Tutorial on Coalgebras and Game Logics
The next lemma shows an important technique for working with integrals, perceived as extensions
of measures; we will need this property badly when we are discussing the Giry monad. The
question arises naturally how to integrate with respect to the measure K∗(µ), so we will try to
piece the integration together from the integrals wrt the measures K(x) for every x ∈ X, and from
the integral wrt µ.
Lemma 4.7 Let X, Y, K, µ as above, then we have for all f ∈ F(Y)
1. x 7→ ∫
Y
f(y) K(x)(dy) defines a measurable and bounded function on X.
2.
∫
X
f(x) K∗(µ)(dx) =
∫
X
(∫
Y
f(y) K(x)(dy)
)
µ(dx).
Proof 0. This is established very similar to the principle of good sets (see the proof of Lemma 3.5).
Put
E := {f ∈ F(Y) | the assertions are true for f}.
Then clearly E is a vector space over R. We show that χB ∈ E for B ⊆ Y measurable; since E is
closed under bounded limits, the assertion follows from the observation that linear combinations
of indicator functions are dense in F(X). The most complicated thing is to show that χB ∈ E ,
which we will do now.
1. We claim that both assertions are true for f = χB, if B ⊆ Y is a measurable set. This is so
because in this case we have for the first claim
x 7→ ∫
Y
f(y) K(x)(dy) =
∫
Y
χB(y) K(x)(dy) = K(x)(B)
and x 7→ K(x)(B) defines a measurable function by definition of the *-σ-algebra. From this we
obtain ∫
X
(∫
Y
χB(y) K(x)(dy)
)
µ(dx) =
∫
X
(
K(x)(B)
)
µ(dx)
= K∗(µ)(B) (inner integral)
=
∫
X
χB(y) K
∗(µ)(dy) (extension property)
2. If f =
∑n
i=1 αi · χBi is a step function with measurable sets B1, . . . , Bn, the assertion follows
from the first part through the additivity of the integral.
3. The measurable step functions are dense in F(X) with respect to pointwise convergence, so the
assertion follows from the second part, and from continuity of the integral. ⊣
This provides us with an amazing consequence.
Proposition 4.8 Let X, Y and Z be measurable spaces, K : X → $ (Y) and L : Y → $ (Y) be
measurable maps. Then K∗ ◦ L∗ = (K∗ ◦ L)∗.
Proof 0. The proof is essentially a special case of Lemma 4.7 (although it does not look like it),
making use of the fact that y 7→ K(y)(C) is a measurable map, and that L(y) is a measure for
each y ∈ Y and each C ⊆ Z measurable.
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1. Let µ ∈ $X, and C ⊆ Z be measurable, then we have
(L∗ ◦ K∗)(µ)(C) = L∗
(
K∗(µ)
)
(C)
=
∫
Y
L(y)(C) K∗(µ)(dy) (definition of −∗)
=
∫
X
(∫
Y
L(y)(C) K(x)(dy)
)
µ(dx) (apply Lemma 4.7)
=
∫
X
L∗(K(x))(C) µ(dx) (note that
(
. . .
)
= L∗(K(x))(C))
= (L∗ ◦ K)∗(µ)(C) (definition of −∗)
⊣
Example 4.9 Lift f : X→ 2X to f∗ : 2X → 2X upon setting
f∗(A) :=
⋃
x∈A f(x).
Then an easy computation which the reader is invited to perform shows that f∗ ◦ g∗ = (f∗ ◦ g)∗
holds. ✌
Example 4.10 Lift f : X→ EE(X) to f∗ : EE(X)→ EE(X) upon setting
f∗(C) :=
{
B ⊆ X | {x | B ∈ f(x)} ∈ C
}
.
Then an easy computation with a similar scope shows that f∗ ◦ g∗ = (f∗ ◦ g)∗ holds holds. ✌
This is certainly not such a strange coincidence.
Definition 4.11 Let C be a category, T be a map which maps the objects in C to objects in C.
Assume that we have a map −∗ which maps morphisms f : x → Ty to morphisms f∗ : Tx → Ty
(called lifting), and a morphism ηx : x → Tx (called embedding) for each object x in C. Then
(T,−∗, η) is called a monad iff these conditions hold (here x, y, z are objects in C): Monad
1. η∗x = idTx.
2. f∗ ◦ ηx = f, whenever f : x→ Ty.
3. g∗ ◦ f∗ = (g∗ ◦ f)∗, whenever f : x→ Ty, g : y→ Tz.
What we call a monad here is usually called a Kleisli tripel in the literature. By Manes’ Theorem [9,
Theorem 2.4.4], Kleisli tripels and monads are equivalent. Introducing monads in this way has
the advantage of not having to introduce natural transformations and the slightly complicated
diagrams associated with it.
Note that T is only assumed to map objects to objects, but the laws of a monad permit defining
it on morphisms as well.
Lemma 4.12 Let (T,−∗, η) be a monad over C. Then T can be extended to an endofunctor on
C.
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Proof Define Tf := (ηy ◦ f)∗ for f : x→ y. Then Tf : Tx→ Ty is a morphism in C with
1. Tidx = η
∗
x = idTx.
2. Assume f : x→ y and g : y→ z, then we have
(Tg) ◦ (Tf) = (ηz ◦ g)
∗ ◦ (ηy ◦ f)
∗ (definition)
(‡)
=
(
(ηz ◦ g)
∗ ◦ ηy ◦ f
)∗
= (ηz ◦ g ◦ f)
∗ (from 3. in Definition 4.11)
= T(g ◦ f).
Equation (‡) uses the interplay of η and the −∗-operation, see property 2. in Definition 4.11.
⊣
We are now in proud possession of the following monads:
Some
monads
1. Power set monad 2−, f∗ according to Example 4.9, ηX(a) := {a} for a ∈ X.
2. Upper closed monad EE, f∗ according to Example 4.10, ηX(a) := {A ⊆ X | a ∈ A} for a ∈ X.
3. Probability monad $, K∗ according to Example 4.6, η is given through the Dirac kernel from
Example 3.9.
If you want to try your hand at other monads, try these:
Some other
monads
1. The ultra filter monad over the category of sets. Let U(X) be all ultrafilters over set X, and
define U(f) : U(X) → U(Y) for a given map f : X → Y verbatim as for upper closed sets
in Example 2.8, replacing the argument to U(f) by an ultrafilter (it has to be shown that
U(f)(C) ∈ U(Y); this requires some thought). Define the embedding X → U(X) as in the
case of the upper closed subsets.
2. The discrete probability monad over the category of sets. Define
D(X) := {p : X→ [0, 1] | p has countable support, and ∑x∈X p(x) = 1},
where the support of a map p : X→ [0, 1] is defined as {x ∈ X | p(x) 6= 0} (hence the sum is
defined). Let f : X→ Y be a map, p ∈ D(X), define
D(f)(p)(y) :=
∑
f(x)=y
p(x).
Then show that D(f)(p) ∈ D(Y). The embedding is defined as the Dirac kernel from Exam-
ple 3.9.
We identify in what follows a monad with its functor, so that things are a bit easier to handle. If,
however, we need the components, we will be explicit about them.
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Proposition 4.13 A monad T over category C generates a new category CT in the following
Kleisli
category
way:
1. The objects of CT are the objects of C,
2. A CT-morphism f : x y in the new category is a C-morphism f : x→ Ty in C. f : x y
3. The identity for a in CT is ηa : a→ Ta.
4. The composition g ∗ f of f : x y and g : y z is defined through g ∗ f := g∗ ◦ f.
This category is called the Kleisli category associated with T (and C, of course).
Proof We have to show that the laws of a category are satisfied, hence in particular that Kleisli
composition is associative. In fact, we have
(h ∗ g) ∗ f = (h ∗ g)∗ ◦ f
= (h∗ ◦ g)∗ ◦ f (definition of h ∗ g)
= h∗ ◦ g∗ ◦ f (property 3. in a monad)
= h∗ ◦ (g ∗ f) (definition of g ∗ f)
= h ∗ (f ∗ g)
The laws for the identity are easily checked from the properties of −∗. Thus CT is indeed a
category. ⊣
Example 4.14 The Kleisli morphisms for the power set monad are exactly the relations, and we
have for R : X Y and S : Y  Z that
z ∈ (R ∗ S)(x)⇔ z ∈ S(y) for some y ∈ R(x).
This is immediate. ✌
Example 4.15 The Kleisli morphisms for the Giry monad are exactly the stochastic relations,
a.k.a. transition probabilities. Let K : X Y and L : Y  Z be stochastic relations, then we have
(L ∗ K)(x)(C) =
∫
Y
L(y)(C) K(x)(dy),
when x ∈ X and C ⊆ Z is a measurable set. This follows immediately from the definition of −∗
for this monad. ✌
5 Playing Around with Morphisms
Measurable spaces form a category under measurable maps. In fact, given a measurable space
(X,A),
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1. we can find for a map f : Z→ X a smallest σ-algebra C on Z which renders f a (Z, C)-(X,A)-
measurable map. Take simply
C := {f−1
[
A
]
| A ∈ A}.
C is called the initial σ-algebra with respect to f and A. Initial
2. we can find for a map g : X→ Y a largest σ-algebra B on Y such that g isA-(Y,B)-measurable.
Take simply
B := {B ⊆ Y | f−1
[
B
]
∈ A}.
B is called the final σ-algebra with respect to g and A. Final
Both constructions extend easily to families of maps fi : Zi → X resp. gi : X→ Yi. For example,
the *-σ-algebra on $ (X) is the initial σ-algebra with respect to the family {evA | A ∈ A}, with
evA : µ 7→ µ(A), and the product-σ-algebra A ⊗ B on the Cartesian product X × Y is the initial A⊗ B
σ-algebra on X× Y with respect to the projections πX and πY .
Given an equivalence relation τ on X, define A/τ as the final σ-algebra on the set X/τ of equivalence
classes with respect to the factor map ρτ : x 7→ [x]τ. We assume that this space is always equipped
with this σ-algebra.
Equivalence relation τ defines also a σ-algebra on X, the σ-algebra of τ-invariant (measurable)
sets, upon setting Στ
Στ := Στ,A := {A ∈ A | A is τ-invariant}
(recall that set A is τ-invariant iff it is the union of τ-classes, or, equivalently, iff x ∈ A and x τ x ′
together imply x ′ ∈ A). Look at this equivalence
A ∈ Στ ⇔ ρτ[A] ∈ A/τ.
Does it always hold? In fact, this is true, and it hinges on the equality ρ−1τ
[
ρτ
[
A
]]
= A for
τ-invariant A ⊆ X (⊆: If ρτ(x) ∈ ρτ
[
A
]
, there exists x ′ ∈ A with x ρ x ′, hence x ∈ A; ⊇: is
trivial). An equivalent formulation is evidently
A/τ = {A ⊆ X/τ | ρ−1τ
[
A
]
∈ Στ}.
Στ is a fairly important σ-algebra, as we will see. Occasionally one considers as an equivalence
relation the kernel ker (f) of a measurable map f : X→ Y. It is defined as
Kernel,
ker (f)
ker (f) := {〈x, x ′〉 | f(x) = f(x ′)}.
We are now in a position to define congruences for stochastic relations on a measurable space X.
Remember that a stochastic relation K : X X is a coalgebra (X,K) for the Giry functor.
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Definition 5.1 Let K : X  X be a stochastic relation. An equivalence relation τ is called a
congruence for K iff there exists a stochastic relation Kτ : X/τ  X/τ such that ρτ : K → Kτ is a
morphism.
Let us see what it means that τ is a congruence for K. Since we are dealing with coalgebras here,
this means that this diagram commutes
X
K

ρτ // X/τ
Kτ

$ (X)
$(ρτ)
// $ (X/τ)
Hence we have for x ∈ X and A ⊆ X/τ measurable this equality
Kτ([x]τ)(A) = (Kτ ◦ ρτ)(x)(A) =
(
$ (ρτ) ◦ K(x)
)
(A) = K(x)(ρ−1τ
[
A
]
).
This means that the behavior of K(x) on the σ-algebra Στ determines the behavior of Kτ([x]τ)
completely. This is intuitively somewhat satisfying: if τ cannot distinguish between x and x ′,
then K(x)(A) should be the same as K(x ′)(A) for all A the elements of which τ cannot tell apart
(actually, this is how a congruence was first defined for K).
In universal algebra there is a strong connection between the kernels of morphisms and congru-
ences, actually, e.g., in Abelian groups, the kernel of a morphism is a congruence, and vice versa.
In general, additional conditions are necessary. A measurable map f : X → Y is called strong iff Strong
f is surjective so that Y carries the final σ-algebra with respect to f; note that being strong is an
intrinsic property of f and is independent of any $-coalgebra.
Proposition 5.2 Let (X,K) and (Y, L) be $-coalgebras, and f : (X,K) → (Y, L) is a strong mor-
phism. Then ker (f) is a congruence. Conversely, if τ is a congruence for (X,K), then ρτ is a
strong morphism.
Proof The assertion about ρτ is trivial from the construction, and since ker (ρτ) = τ. The converse
follows from some observations on general coalgebras based on sets, and a characterization of Σf
for strong f in [9, Section 2.6.2]. ⊣
We want to define subsystems for a $-coalgebra (X,K), X = (X,A) being a measurable space again.
Subsystems are determined through a sub-σ-algebra B ⊆ A and through a transition law, say, L.
Note that the identity iX : X → X is A-B-measurable iff B ⊆ A. This time we have to make the
σ-algebra explicit.
Definition 5.3
(
(X,B), L
)
is a subsystem of
(
(X,A), K
)
iff the identity is a morphism iX : Subsystem(
(X,A), K
)→ ((X,B), L).
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Again, we have this diagram, which commutes for a subsystem:
(X,A)
K

iX // (X,B)
L

$ (X,A)
$(iX)
// $ (X,B)
Hence K(x)(B) = L(x)(B) for all x ∈ X, and all B ∈ B, which may be interpreted either that K(x)
is an extension to L(x) or that L(x) is the restriction of K(x), depending on the situation at hand.
Sometimes a subsystem is called a state bisimulation, but I think that this is an unfortunate name,
because bisimilarity as a means of comparing the expressivity of systems through a mediator is
nowhere to be seen. A subsystem will be identified it through its σ-algebra B; the coalgebra is
then defined through the restriction to B.
It is immediate that a congruence τ defines a subsystem with Στ as the defining σ-algebra.
6 Bisimulations
The notion of bisimilarity is fundamental for the application of coalgebras to system modelling.
Bisimilar coalgebras behave in a similar fashion, witnessed by a mediating system.
Definition 6.1 Let F be an endofunctor on a category C. The F-coalgebras (a, f) and (b, g) are
said to be bisimilar iff there exists a coalgebra (m, v) and coalgebra morphisms
Bisimilar,
mediating
(a, f) (m, v)oo // (b, g).
The coalgebra (m, v) is called mediating.
Thus we obtain this characteristic diagram with ℓ and r as the corresponding morphisms.
a
f

m
v

ℓoo r // b
g

Fa Fm
Fℓ
oo
Fr
// Fb
This gives us f ◦ ℓ = (Fℓ) ◦ v and together with g ◦ r = (Fr) ◦ v. It is easy to see why (M,m) is
called mediating.
Bisimilarity was originally investigated when concurrent systems became of interest [14]. The
original formulation, however, was not coalgebraic but rather relational. Here it is (for the sake
of easier reading, we use arrows rather that relations or maps into the respective power set):
Definition 6.2 Let (S, S) and (T, T ) be transition systems. Then B ⊆ S × T is called a
bisimulation iff for all 〈s, t〉 ∈ B these conditions are satisfied:
Bisimulation,
2−
1. if s S s
′, then there is a t ′ ∈ T such that t T t ′ and 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B,
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2. if t T t
′, then there is a s ′ ∈ S such that s S s ′ and 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B.
Hence a bisimulation simulates transitions in one system through the other one. On first sight,
these notions of bisimilarity are not related to each other. Recall that transition systems are
coalgebras for the power set functor 2−. This is the connection:
Theorem 6.3 Given the transition systems (S, S) and (T, T ) with the associated 2
−-coalgebras
(S, f) and (T, g), then these statements are equivalent for B ⊆ S× T :
Aczel’s
Theorem
1. B is a bisimulation.
2. There exists a 2−-coalgebra structure h on B such that (S, f) (B, h)oo // (T, g) with
the projections as morphisms is mediating.
Proof That (S, f) (B, h)
πSoo
πT // (T, g) is mediating follows from commutativity of this dia-
gram.
S
f

B
h

πSoo
πT // T
g

2−(S) 2−(B)
22−(πS)
oo
22−(πT )
// 2−(T)
“1 ⇒ 2”: We have to construct a map h : B→ 2−(B) such that f(πS(s, t)) = 2−(πS)(h(s, t)) and
f(πT (s, t)) = 2
−(πT )(h(s, t)) for all 〈s, t〉 ∈ B. The choice is somewhat obvious: put for 〈s, t〉 ∈ B
h(s, t) := {〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B | s S s
′, t T t
′}.
Thus h : B→ 2−(B) is a map, hence (B, h) is a 2−-coalgebra.
Now fix 〈s, t〉 ∈ B, then we claim that f(s) = 2−(πS)(h(s, t)).
“⊆”: Let s ′ ∈ f(s), hence s S s ′, thus there exists t ′ with 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B such that t T t ′, hence
s ′ ∈ {πS(s0, t0) | 〈s0, t0〉 ∈ h(s, t)} = {s0 | 〈s0, t0〉 ∈ h(s, t) for some t0} = 2
−(πS)(h(s, t)).
“⊇”: If s ′ ∈ 2−(πS)(h(s, t)), then in particular s S s ′, thus s ′ ∈ f(s).
Thus we have shown that 2−(πS)(h(s, t)) = f(s) = f(πS(s, t)). One shows 2
−(πT )(h(s, t)) =
g(t) = f(πT (s, t)) in exactly the same way. We have constructed h such that (B, h) is a 2
−-
coalgebra, and such that the diagrams above commute.
“2 ⇒ 1”: Assume that h exists with the properties described in the assertion, then we have to
show that B is a bisimulation. Now let 〈s, t〉 ∈ B and s  S s ′, hence s ′ ∈ f(s) = f(πS(s, t)) =
2−(πS)(h(s, t)). Thus there exists t
′ with 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ h(s, t) ⊆ B, and hence 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B. We
claim that t  T t
′, which is tantamount to saying t ′ ∈ g(t). But g(t) = 2−(πT )(h(s, t)), and
〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ h(s, t), hence t ′ ∈ 2−(πT )(h(s, t)) = g(t). This establishes t T t ′. A similar argument
finds s ′ with s S s
′ with 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B in case t T t ′.
This completes the proof. ⊣
Thus we may use bisimulations for transition systems as relations and bisimulations as coalgebras
interchangeably, and this characterization suggests a definition in purely coalgebraic terms for
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those cases in which a set-theoretic relation is not available or not adequate. The connection to
2−-coalgebra morphisms and bisimulations is further strengthened by investigating the graph of a
morphism (recall that the graph of a map r : S→ T is the relation graph(r) := {〈s, r(s)〉 | s ∈ S}). graph(r)
Proposition 6.4 Given coalgebras (S, f) and (T, g) for the power set functor 2−, r : (S, f)→ (T, g)
is a morphism iff graph(r) is a bisimulation for (S, f) and (T, g).
Proof 1. Assume that r : (S, f)→ (T, g) is a morphism, so that g ◦ r = 2−(r) ◦ f. Now define
h(s, t) := {〈s ′, r(s ′)〉 | s ′ ∈ f(s)} ⊆ graph(r)
for 〈s, t〉 ∈ graph(r). Then g(πT (s, t)) = g(t) = 2
−(πT )(h(s, t)) for t = r(s).
“⊆”: If t ′ ∈ g(t) for t = r(s), then
t ′ ∈ g(r(s)) = 2−(r)(f(s)) = {r(s ′) | s ′ ∈ f(s)}
= 2−(πT )({〈s ′, r(s ′)〉 | s ′ ∈ f(s)}) = 2−(πT )(h(s, t))
“⊇”: If 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ h(s, t), then s ′ ∈ f(s) and t ′ = r(s ′), but this implies t ′ ∈ 2−(r)(f(s)) = g(r(s)).
Thus g ◦ πT = 2−(πT ) ◦ h. The equation f ◦ πS = 2−(πS) ◦ h is established similarly.
Hence we have found a coalgebra structure h on graph(r) such that
(S, f) (graph(r), h)
πSoo
πT // (T, g)
are coalgebra morphisms, so that (graph(r), h) is now officially a bisimulation.
2. If, conversely, (graph(r), h) is a bisimulation with the projections as morphisms, then we have
r = πT ◦ π
−1
S . Then πT is a morphism, and π
−1
S is a morphism as well (note that we work on the
graph of r). So r is a morphism. ⊣
Let us have a look at upper closed sets. There we find a comparable situation. We cannot, however,
translate the definition directly, because we do not have access to the transitions proper, but rather
to the sets from which the next state may come from. Let (S, f) and (T, g) be EE-coalgebras, and
assume that 〈s, t〉 ∈ B. Assume X ∈ f(s), then we want to find Y ∈ g(t) such that, when we take
t ′ ∈ Y, we find a state s ′ ∈ X with s ′ being related via B to s ′, and vice versa. Formally:
Definition 6.5 Let again
EES := {V ⊆ 2−(S) | V is upper closed}
be the endofunctor on Set which assigns to set S all upper closed subsets of 2−S. Given EE-
Bisimulation,
EE
coalgebras (S, f) and (T, g), a subset B ⊆ S × T is called a bisimulation of (S, f) and (T, g) iff for
each 〈s, t〉 ∈ B
1. for all X ∈ f(s) there exists Y ∈ g(t) such that for each t ′ ∈ Y there exists s ′ ∈ X with
〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B,
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2. for all Y ∈ g(t) there exists X ∈ f(s) such that for each s ′ ∈ X there exists t ′ ∈ Y with
〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B.
We have then a comparable characterization of bisimilar coalgebras [7].
Proposition 6.6 Let (S, f) and (T, g) be coalgebras for EE. Then the following statements are
equivalent for B ⊆ S× T with πS
[
B
]
= S and πT
[
B
]
= T
1. B is a bisimulation of (S, f) and (T, g).
2. There exists a coalgebra structure h on B so that the projections πS : B→ S, πT : B→ T are
morphisms (S, f) (B, h)
πSoo
πT // (T, g).
Proof “1 ⇒ 2”: Define 〈s, t〉 ∈ B
h(s, t) := {D ⊆ B | πS
[
D
]
∈ f(s) and πT
[
D
]
∈ f(t)}.
Hence h(s, t) ⊆ 2 S, and because both f(s) and g(t) are upper closed, so is h(s, t).
Now fix 〈s, t〉 ∈ B. We show first that f(s) = {πS
[
Z
]
| Z ∈ h(s, t)}. From the definition of
h(s, t) it follows that πS
[
Z
]
∈ f(s) for each Z ∈ h(s, t). So we have to establish the other
inclusion. Let X ∈ f(s), then X = πS
[
π−1S
[
X
]]
, because πS : B → S is onto, so it suffices to
show that π−1S
[
X
]
∈ h(s, t), hence that πT
[
π−1S
[
X
]]
∈ g(t). Given X there exists Y ∈ g(t) so
that for each t ′ ∈ Y there exists s ′ ∈ X such that 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B. Thus Y = πT
[
(X × Y) ∩ B
]
.
But this implies Y ⊆ πT
[
π−1S
[
X
]]
, hence Y ⊆ πT
[
π−1S
[
X
]]
∈ g(t). One similarly shows that
g(t) = {πT
[
Z
]
| Z ∈ h(s, t)}.
In a second step, we show that
{πS
[
Z
]
| Z ∈ h(s, t)} = {C | π−1S
[
C
]
∈ h(s, t)}.
In fact, if C = πS
[
Z
]
for some Z ∈ h(s, t), then Z ⊆ π−1S
[
C
]
= π−1S
[
πS
[
Z
]]
, hence π−1S
[
C
]
∈
h(s, t). If, conversely, Z := π−1S
[
C
]
∈ h(s, t), then C = πS
[
Z
]
. Thus we obtain
f(s) = {πS
[
Z
]
| Z ∈ h(s, t)} = {C | π−1S
[
C
]
∈ h(s, t)} = (EEπS)(h(s, t))
for 〈s, t〉 ∈ B. Summarizing, this means that πS : (B, h) → (S, f) is a morphism. A very similar
argumentation shows that πT : (B, h)→ (T, g) is a morphism as well.
“2 ⇒ 1”: Assume, conversely, that the projections are coalgebra morphisms, and let 〈s, t〉 ∈ B.
Given X ∈ f(s), we know that X = πS
[
Z
]
for some Z ∈ h(s, t). Thus we find for any t ′ ∈ Y some
s ′ ∈ X with 〈s ′, t ′〉 ∈ B. The symmetric property of a bisimulation is established exactly in the
same way. Hence B is a bisimulation for (S, f) and (T, g). ⊣
We will now turn to bisimulations for stochastic systems. A bisimulation relates two transition
systems which are connected through a mediating system. In order to define this for the present
context, we extend the crucial notion of morphisms slightly in a straightforward manner; this will
be helpful in the discussions to follow.
Definition 6.7 A morphism m = (f, g) : K1 → K2 for stochastic relations Ki : (Xi,Ai) (Yi,Bi)
Morphism,
again
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(i = 1, 2) over general measurable spaces is given through the measurable maps f : X1 → X2 and
g : Y1 → Y2 such that this diagram of measurable maps commutes
(X1,A1)
K1

f // (X2,A2)
K2

$ (Y1,B1)
$(g)
// $ (Y2,B2)
Equivalently, K2(f(x1)) = $ (g) (K1(x1)), which translates to K2(f(x1))(B) = K1(x1)(g
−1
[
B
]
) for
all B ∈ B2.
Definition 6.8 The stochastic relations Ki : (Xi,Ai)  (Yi,Bi) (i = 1, 2), are called bisimilar
Bisimilarity,
$
iff there exist a stochastic relation M : (A,X )  (B,Y) and surjective morphisms mi = (fi, gi) :
M→ Ki such that the σ-algebra g−11 [B1]∩ g−12 [B2] is nontrivial, i.e., contains not only ∅ and B.
The relation M is called mediating.
The first condition on bisimilarity is in accordance with the general definition of bisimilarity of
coalgebras; it requests that m1 and m2 form a span of morphisms
K1 M
m1oo
m2 // K2.
Hence, the following diagram of measurable maps is supposed to commute with mi = (fi, gi) for
i = 1, 2
(X1,A1)
K1

(A,X )
f1oo
f2 //
M

(X2,A2)
K2

$ (Y1,B1) $ (B,Y)
$(g1)
oo
$(g2)
// $ (Y2,B2)
Thus, for each a ∈ A,D ∈ B1, E ∈ B2 the equalities
K1
(
f1(a)
)
(D) =
(
$ (g1) ◦M
)
(a)(D) = M(a)
(
g−11
[
D
])
K2
(
f2(a)
)
(E) =
(
$ (g2) ◦M
)
(a)(E) = M(a)
(
g−12
[
E
])
should be satisfied. The second condition, however, is special; it states that we can find an event
C∗ ∈ Y which is common to both K1 and K2 in the sense that
g−11
[
B1
]
= C∗ = g−12
[
B2
]
for some B1 ∈ B1 and B2 ∈ B2 such that both C∗ 6= ∅ and C∗ 6= B hold (note that for C∗ = ∅ or
C∗ = B we can always take the empty and the full set, respectively). Given such a C∗ with B1, B2
from above we get for each a ∈ A
K1(f1(a))(B1) =M(a)(g
−1
1
[
B1
]
) =M(a)(C∗) = M(a)(g−12
[
B2
]
) = K2(g2(a))(B2);
thus the event C∗ ties K1 and K2 together. Loosely speaking, g
−1
1
[
B1
]
∩g−12
[
B2
]
can be described
as the σ-algebra of common events, which is required to be nontrivial.
August 27, 2018 E.-E. Doberkat
Page 23 Tutorial on Coalgebras and Game Logics
Note that without the second condition two relations K1 and K2 would always be bisimilar: Put
A := X1 × X2, B := Y1 × Y2 and set for 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ A as the mediating relation M(x1, x2) :=
K1(x1) ⊗ K2(x2); that is, define M pointwise to be the product measure of K1 and K2. Then
the projections will make the diagram commutative. But although this notion of bisimilarity is
sometimes suggested, it is way too weak, because bisimulations relate transition systems, and it
does not promise particularly interesting insights when two arbitrary systems can be related. It
is also clear that using products for mediation does not work for the subprobabilistic case. But
the definition above captures the general case as well.
7 Expressivity of Kripke Models
Transition kernels will be used now for interpreting modal logics. Consider this grammar for
formulas
ϕ ::= ⊤ | ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 | ✸qϕ
with q ∈ Q, q ≥ 0. Note that the logic is negation free and has on the propositional level only
conjunction; this may be motivated by the observation that we work in a Boolean set algebra in
which negation is available.
The informal interpretation in a probabilistic transition system is that ⊤ always holds, and that
✸qϕ holds with probability not smaller than q after a transition in a state in which formula ϕ
holds. Now let K : X X be a transition kernel for the measurable space X, and define inductively
[[⊤]]K := X
[[ϕ1 ∧ϕ2]]K := [[ϕ1]]K ∩ [[ϕ2]]K
[[✸qϕ]]K := {x ∈ X | K(x)([[ϕ]]K) ≥ q}
= K−1
[
βA([[ϕ]]K, q)
]
One shows by induction on the structure of the formula that the sets [[ϕ]]K are measurable, since K
is a stochastic relation. We say that ϕ holds in x ∈ X iff x ∈ [[ϕ]]K; this is also written as K, x |= ϕ.
Note that ϕ does not hold in x iff x ∈ X \ [[ϕ]]K, the latter set being measurable. This observation
supports the decision to omit negation as an operator.
One usually takes a set of actions and defines modalities 〈a〉r for action a, generalizing ✸r. For
the sake of argument, I will stick for the time being to the very simple case of having only one
action. The arguments for the general case will be exactly the same, taking into account that one
deals with a family of stochastic relations rather than with one relation. I will also do without
primitive formulas and introduce them only when I need them; they do not add to the argument’s
substance right now. A Kripke model with state space X and transition law K is just a $-coalgebra
Kripke
model
(X,K), for the extensions see page 28.
Define for state x ∈ X its theory by ThK(x)
ThK(x) := {ϕ | x ∈ [[ϕ]]K} = {ϕ | K, x |= ϕ}
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For comparing the expressivity of Kripke models, we use these approaches Expressivity
• (X,K) is logically equivalent to (Y, L) iff
{ThK(x) | x ∈ X} = {ThL(y) | y ∈ Y},
thus iff given a state x ∈ X, there exists a state y ∈ Y with exactly the same theory, and vice
versa.
• (X,K) is behaviorally equivalent to (Y, L) iff there exists a Kripke model (Z,M) and surjective
morphisms
(X,K)
f // (Z,M) (Y, L).
g
oo
Model (Z,M) is called mediating (and the diagram a co-span).
Span,
co-span
• (X,K) is bisimilar to (Y, L) iff there exists a Kripke model (Z,M) and surjective morphisms
(X,K) (Z,M)
foo
g
// (Y, L)
such that the σ-algebra of common events is not trivial. Model (Z,M) is also calledmediating
(and the diagram a span).
We will investigate these notions of expressivity now. Note that there are many variants to
bisimilarity, e.g., state bisimulations, but life is difficult enough, so I will not not deal with them
here.
The key property in this business is
Proposition 7.1 Let (X,K) and (Y, L) be Kripke models and a morphism f : (X,K)→ (Y, L). Then
K, x |= ϕ iff L, f(x) |= ϕ
holds for all x ∈ X and all formulas ϕ.
Proof The assertion is equivalent to [[ϕ]]K = f
−1
[
[[ϕ]]L
]
for all ϕ. This is clear for ϕ = ⊤, and if it
is true for formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, then it is true also for ϕ1∧ϕ2. The interesting case is ϕ1 = ✸rϕ:
[[✸rϕ]]K = {x ∈ X | K(x)([[ϕ]]K) ≥ r} (definition)
= {x ∈ X | K(x)(f−1
[
[[ϕ]]L
]
) ≥ r} (induction hypothesis)
= {x ∈ X | L(f(x))([[ϕ]]L) ≥ r} (f is a morphism)
= f−1
[
[[✸rϕ]]L
]
⊣
This provides us with an easy consequence:
Corollary 7.2 Behaviorally equivalent Kripke models are logically equivalent, so are bisimilar
Kripke models.
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The classical Hennessy-Milner Theorem [9, Theorem 2.7.32] for transition systems states that
logically equivalent models are behaviorally equivalent, provided the models are image finite.
This condition used to prevent the system from becoming too large, but is difficult to model for
stochastic Kripke models. Hence we need a condition which is intended restrict the size of the
system, so we need a condition for smallness. Here we proceed as follows.
Fix a Kripke model (X,K). The logic induces an equivalence relation α on X upon setting
x α x ′ ⇔ [K, x |= ϕ iff K, x ′ |= ϕ] for all formulas ϕ.
Thus x α x ′ iff the logic cannot distinguish between x and x ′. The discussion above shows that we
may factor X, obtaining the factor space X/α. Moreover we know that K(x)([[ϕ]]K) = K(x
′)([[ϕ]]K),
provided x α x ′ (suppose there exists r with K(x)([[ϕ]]K) < r ≤ K(x
′)([[ϕ]]K), hence K, x
′ |= ✸rϕ,
but K, x 6|= ✸rϕ). This means that α is a congruence for K, the σ-algebra on the factor space
being generated by the α-invariant sets ΣX,α. On the other hand, we have the σ-algebra ΘX :=
σ({[[ϕ]]K | ϕ is a formula}) which is generated by the validity sets for the formulas (recall that each
validity set is measurable). Since each validity set is α-invariant, we have ΘX ⊆ ΣX,α. It may
happen, however, that the containment is proper [6, Example 2.6.7].
Definition 7.3 The Kripke model is said to be small iff Σα = σ
(
{[[ϕ]]K | ϕ is a formula}
)
.
Small
Kripke
model
Smallness will permit us to establish an analogon to the Hennessy-Milner Theorem; technically, it
says that the σ-algebra on the factor space is determined by the images of the validity sets under
the factor map ρα:
Lemma 7.4 If (X,K) is small, then A/α = σ
(
{ρα
[
[[ϕ]]K
]
| ϕ is a formula}
)
. ⊣
Smallness also ensures that we have a ∩-stable generator for the factor σ-algebra (note that
ρα
[
A ∩ B
]
= ρα
[
A
]
∩ ρα
[
B
]
if A and B are α-invariant) , so that we have — in view of the
π-λ-Theorem — a fairly practical handle to deal with the factor space. This will be seen in a
moment.
Recall that topological space is called Polish iff it is second countable, and its topology can be
Polish,
analytic
metrized by a complete metric; examples include the reals R, [0, 1]N, the bounded continuous
functions over R, and $X, if X is Polish; the rationals Q are not Polish. A measurable image of a
Polish space is called an analytic space. Polish spaces, and to some extent, analytic spaces, have
very convenient measure theoretic properties (for a general and accessible account, see [24], for a
discussion tailored towards the purposes discussed here, see [9, Sections 4.3, 4.4]).
We note that a Kripke model over a Polish space is always small. This is so because the equiv-
alence relation induced by the logic is smooth, i.e., countably generated, because the logic has Smooth
only countably many formulas. The observation follows then from some general properties about
smooth equivalence relations on Polish spaces [9, Proposition 4.4.26].
Now let (X,K) and (Y, L) be small models which are logically equivalent. We want to show that
they are behaviorally equivalent, so we have to construct a mediator. Let αK resp. αL be the
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corresponding equivalence relations with classes [·]K and ρK as factor map, similarly for L. Define
ℜ := {〈x, y〉 | ThK(x) = ThL(y)},
ℜ0 := {〈[x]K , [y]L〉 | 〈x, y〉 ∈ ℜ}
Since the models are logically equivalent, ℜ is both left and right total. We will show now that
ℜ0 is the graph of a bi-measurable map f : X/R → Y/L. From the construction of ℜ0 it is clear
that f is a bijection, so we have to cater for measurability. This is done through the principle of
good sets in conjunction with the π-λ-Theorem. Consider
D := {B ⊆ Y/L measurable | f−1
[
B
]
⊆ X/K is measurable}.
Then D is closed under complementation and under countable disjoint unions. Let ϕ be a formula,
then
f−1
[
ρL
[
[[ϕ]]L
]]
= ρK
[
[[ϕ]]K
]
.
Thus ρL
[
[[ϕ]]L
]
∈ D for each formula ϕ. Since {ρL
[
[[ϕ]]L
]
| ϕ is a formula} is a ∩-stable generator
of the factor σ-algebra due to (Y, L) being small, we conclude from the π-λ-Theorem that D equals
the σ-algebra of all measurable sets of Y/L. This shows that f is measurable, the argumentation
is exactly the same for f−1. Consequently, ℜ0 is the graph of an isomorphism.
Now look at this diagram:
X
ρK

Y
ρL

X/αK Y/αL
Since ρK as well as ρL are morphisms (X,K) → (X/αK, Kα) resp. (Y, L) → (Y/αL, Lα), we have
established this counterpart to the Hennessy-Milner Theorem:
Proposition 7.5 Small logically equivalent Kripke models are behaviorally equivalent. ⊣
What about bisimilarity? Rutten’s paper [21] gives a calculus of bisimilarity for coalgebras. Un-
fortunately the really interesting properties assume that the functor under consideration preserves
weak pullbacks. This is not the case for the Giry functor, as the following example demonstrates.
It presents a situation in which no semi-pullback exists. A first example in this direction was
suggested in [22, Theorem 12]. It is based on the extension of Lebesgue measure to a σ-algebra
which does contain the Borel sets of [0, 1] augmented by a non-measurable set, and it shows that
one can construct Markov transition systems which do not have a semi-pullback. The example
below simplifies this by showing that one does not have to consider transition systems, but that a
look at the measures on which they are based suffices.
Example 7.6 A morphism f : (X,A, µ)→ (Y,B, ν) of measure spaces is an A-B-measurable map
f : X→ Y such that ν = $ (f) (µ). Since each finite measure can be viewed as a transition kernel,
this is a special case of morphisms for transition kernels. If B is a sub-σ-algebra of A with µ an
extension to ν, then the identity is a morphisms (X,A, µ)→ (X,B, ν).
Denote Lebesgue measure on ([0, 1],B([0, 1])) by λ. Assuming the Axiom of Choice, we know that
there exists W ⊆ [0, 1] with λ∗(W) = 0 and λ∗(W) = 1. Here λ∗ and λ∗ denote the inner resp.
August 27, 2018 E.-E. Doberkat
Page 27 Tutorial on Coalgebras and Game Logics
outer measure associated with Lebesgue measure. The technical condition says that whenever we
have a measurable set P ⊆ W, then λ(P) = 0 must hold, and whenever we have a measurable
set Q with W ⊆ Q, then λ(Q) = 1. These conditions make sure that W is not in the universal
completion of [0, 1], which means that Lebesgue measure cannot be extended uniquely to it in a
canonic way.
But we find other, less canonic extensions, actually, plenty of them. Denote by
AW := σ(B([0, 1]) ∪ {W})
the smallest σ-algebra containing the Borel sets of [0, 1] and W. We find for each α ∈ [0, 1] a
measure µα on AW which extends λ such that µα(W) = α by [9, Exercise 4.6].
Hence by the remark just made, the identity yields a morphism
fα :
(
[0, 1],AW , µα
)→ ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ).
Now let α 6= β, then
(
[0, 1],AW , µα
) fα // ([0, 1],B([0, 1]), λ) ([0, 1],AW , µβ)fβoo
is a co-span of morphisms. We claim that this co-span does not have a semi-pullpack. In fact,
assume that (P,P , ρ) with morphisms πα and πβ is a semi-pullback, then fα ◦ πα = fβ ◦ πβ, so
that πα = πβ, and π
−1
α
[
W
]
= π−1β
[
W
]
∈ P . But then
α = µα(W) = ρ(π
−1
α
[
W
]
) = ρ(π−1β
[
W
]
) = µβ(W) = β.
This contradicts the assumption that α 6= β. ✌
The question whether behaviorally equivalent Kripke models are bisimilar was open for quite some
time, until Desharnais, Edalat and Panangaden showed in [3, 12] that behaviorally equivalent
Kripke models based on analytic spaces are bisimilar with an analytic mediating system. This
result was sharpened in [5, 4]: if the contributing models are based on Polish spaces, there exists
a mediator based on a Polish space as well. Interestingly, the proof techniques are very different.
While the analytic case is delt with using conditional expectations, which are known to exist in
analytic spaces, the Polish case is based on a selection argument, which — strange enough — does
not generalize to analytic spaces.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion (see [3] for the analytic case, and [9, Propo-
sition 4.10.20] for the Polish case):
Proposition 7.7 Let (Xi, Ki) be Kripke models over analytic spaces X1, X2, and assume that
(X,K) is a stochastic relation, where X is a second countable metric space. Assume that we have
a co-span of morphisms mi : Ki → K, i = 1, 2, then there exists a stochastic relation M and
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morphisms m+i : M Ki, i = 1, 2 rendering this diagram commutative.
M
m+1 //
m+2

K2
m2

K1 m1
// K
The stochastic relation M is defined over an analytic space. If X1 and X2 are Polish, M can be
defined over a Polish space. ⊣
Proposition 7.7 is the crucial step in establishing [9, Proposition 4.10.22]:
Proposition 7.8 Logically equivalent Kripke models over analytic spaces are bisimilar. The me-
diating model is analytic again. If the contributing models are Polish, the mediator is Polish as
well. ⊣
These results are formulated for Kripke models for the basic modal language with the grammar
Modification
1
ϕ ::= ⊤ | ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 | ✸rϕ
with r ∈ [0, 1]∩Q. They generalize easily to a modal logic in which the modalities are given through
〈a〉r for some action a ∈ A. Here we associate with each action a a stochastic relation Ka : X 
X. A Kripke model is then given through
(
X, (Ka)a∈A
)
, and a morphism f :
(
X, (Ka)a∈A
) →(
Y, (La)a∈A
)
is then a measurable map f : X→ Y such that La ◦ f = $ (f) ◦Ka holds for all a ∈ A.
Another modification addresses the introduction of primitive formulas. The formulas for the
Modification
2
general modal logic now look as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ⊤ | ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 | 〈a〉rϕ
with p ∈ Ψ a primitive formula, a ∈ A an action, and r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q. A Kripke model is now
given through
(
X, (Vp)p∈P, (Ka)a∈A
)
, where Vp ⊆ X is a measurable subset for each p ∈ Ψ,
indicating the set of states in which a primitive formula holds; accordingly, we put [[p]] := Vp.
A morphism f :
(
X, (Vp)p∈Ψ, (Ka)a∈A
) → (Y, (Wp)p∈Ψ, (La)a∈A) is defined as above with the
additional requirement that f−1
[
Wp
]
= Vp holds for each p ∈ Ψ.
The grammar above will be the one to use in the sequel as a sort of shell, where we fill in specific
sets of actions.
8 Stochastic Effectivity Functions
We will now look into the interpretation of game logics; the reader interested in computational
aspects is referred to [18]. In terms of modal logics, the actions are games, so the modalities are
not flat, but rather structured according to the grammar through which games are specified. We
will first make some general remarks.
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Angel and Demon play against each other, taking turns. The two person game is modelled by this
grammar
Two person
game
τ ::= γ | τd | τ1 ∪ τ2 | τ1 ∩ τ2 | τ1; τ2 | τ
∗ | τ×
with γ ∈ Γ , the set of atomic games. Games can be combined in different ways. If τ and τ ′ are
games, τ; τ ′ is the sequential composition of τ1 and τ2, so that plays τ first, then τ
′. In the game
τ∪τ ′, Angel has the first move and decides whether τ or τ ′ is to be played, then the chosen game
is played; τ∪τ ′ is called the angelic choice between τ1 and τ2. Similarly, in τ∩τ ′ Demon has the
first move and decides whether τ or τ ′ is to be played; accordingly, τ ∩ τ ′ is the demonic choice
between the games. In the game τ∗, game τ is played repeatedly, until Angel decides to stop; it is
not said in advance how many times the game is to be played, but it has to stop at some time; this
is called angelic iteration. Dually, Demon decides to stop for the game τ×; this is called demonic
iteration. Finally, the roˆles of Angel and Demon are interchanged in the game τd, so all decisions
made by Demon are now being made by Angel, and vice versa.
When writing down games, we assume for simplicity that composition binds tighter than angelic
or demonic choice. We make these assumptions [20, 18]:
➀ (τd)d is identical to τ (recall that ·d indicates Angel and Demon switching roˆles).
➁ Demonic choice can be represented through angelic choice: The game τ1 ∩ τ2 coincides with
the game (τd1 ∪ τ
d
2 )
d.
➂ Similarly, demonic iteration can be represented through its angelic counterpart: (τ×)d is
equal to (τd)∗,
➃ Composition is right distributive with respect to angelic choice: Making a decision to play τ1
or τ2 and then playing τ should be the same as deciding to play τ1; τ or τ2; τ, thus (τ1∪τ2); τ
equals τ1; τ ∪ τ2; τ.
Note that left distributivity would mean that a choice between τ; τ1 and τ; τ2 is the same
as playing first τ then τ1 ∪ τ2; this is a somewhat restrictive assumption, since the choice of
playing τ1 or τ2 may be a decision made by Angel only after τ is completed [25, p. 191].
Thus we do not assume this in general (it can be shown, however, that in Kripke generated
models these choices are in fact equivalent [9, Proposition 4.9.40]).
➄ We assume similarly that τ∗; τ0 equals τ0 ∪ τ∗; τ; τ0. Hence when playing τ∗; τ0 Angel may
decide to play τ not at all and to continue with τ0 right away, or to play τ
∗ followed by τ; τ0.
Thus τ∗; τ0 expands to τ0 ∪ τ; τ0 ∪ τ; τ; τ0 ∪ . . . .
➅ (τ1; τ2)d is the same as τd1 ; τd2 .
➆ Angelic and demonic choice are commutative and associative, composition is associative.
For arriving at an interpretation, some historic remarks are helpful, and in order. Parikh [18],
and later Pauly [19] propose interpreting game logic through a neighborhood model. Assign to
each primitive game γ and each player (Angel: A; Demon: D) a neighborhood relation N
(i)
g ⊆
S × 2 S (i ∈ {A,D}) with the understanding that xN
(i)
γ S indicates player i having a strategy in N
(i)
g
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state x to force a state in S ⊆ X. Here X is the set of states over which the game is interpreted.
The fact that xN
(i)
γ S is sometimes described by saying that player i is effective for S (with game
γ in state x). It is desirable that xN
(i)
g S and S ⊆ S ′ imply xN
(i)
g S
′ for all states x. We assume
that the game is determined, i.e., that exactly one of the players has a winning strategy. Thus
Determined
game
S ⊆ X is effective for player A in state x if and only if X \ S is not effective for player D in that
state. Consequently,
xN(D)γ S⇔ ¬(xN(A)g X \ S),
which in turn implies that we only have to cater for Angel. We will omit the superscript from the
neighborhood relation Nγ. Define the map Hγ : X→ 2 22X upon setting
Hγ(x) := {S ⊆ X | xNγS},
then Hγ(x) is for all x ∈ X an upper closed subset of 2X from which relation Nγ can be recovered.
This function is called the effectivity function associated with relation Nγ. From Nγ another map
N˜γ : 2
X → 2X is obtained upon setting
N˜γ(A) := {x ∈ X | xNγA} = {x ∈ X | A ∈ Hγ(x)}.
Thus state x is an element of N˜γ(A) iff Angel has a strategy to force the outcome A when playing
γ in x; N˜γ is actually a natural transformation. The operations on games can be taken care of
through this family of maps, e.g., one sets recursively
N˜τ1∪τ2(A) := N˜τ1(A) ∪ N˜τ2(A),
N˜τ1;τ2(A) := (N˜τ1 ◦ N˜τ2)(A),
N˜τ∗ :=
⋃
n≥0
N˜τn(A).
This refers only to Angel, Demon is accommodated through A 7→ S\Nγ(X\A) for primitive game
γ, and by the rules ➀ to ➆ from above. The maps N˜τ serve in Parikh’s original paper as a basis
for defining the semantics of game logic. They are in one-to-one correspondence with effectivity
functions, hence effectivity functions are the main actors.
For a probabilistic interpretation of game logic, it turns out to be convenient to also use effectivity
functions as maps to upper closed subsets. But subsets of what?
We observe these requirements for the portfolio, i.e., for the sets comprising the effectivity function:
Portfolio,
require-
ments
1. The elements of the sets should be probability measures. This is so because we want to force
a distribution over the states, rather than a state proper.
2. The portfolio should consist of measurable sets, so that we can measure them.
3. Stochastic relations should be a special case, hence it should be possible to integrate them
swiftly.
Hence we require measurable sets of probabilities as possible outcomes, but this is not enough.
We will also impose a condition on measurability on the interplay between distributions on states
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and reals for measuring the probabilities of sets of states. This will lead to the definition of a
stochastic effectivity function.
Denote for a measurable space X the *-σ-algebra on $ (X) by B($ (X)), and put
FF(X) := {V ⊆ B($ (X)) | V is upper closed}.
A measurable map f : X→ Y induces a map FF(f) : FF(X)→ FF(Y) upon setting FF(X),FF(f)
FF(f)(V) := {W ∈ B($ (Y)) | $ (f)−1
[
W
]
∈ V}
for V ∈ FF(X), then clearly FF(f)(V) ∈ FF(Y).
Note that FF(X) has not been equipped with a σ-algebra, so the usual notion of measurability
between measurable spaces cannot be applied. In particular, FF is not an endofunctor on the
category of measurable spaces. We will not discuss functorial aspects of FF here, referring the
reader to [8] instead.
It would be most convenient if we could work in a monad — after all, the semantics pertaining
to composition of games is modelled appropriately using a composition operator, as demonstrated
through the definition of N˜τ1;τ2 above. Markov transition systems are based on the Kleisli mor-
phisms for the Giry monad, and the functor assigning each set upper closed subsets of the power
set form a monad as well, see page 14. So one might want to capitalize on the composition of these
monads. Alas, it is well known that the composition of two monads is not necessarily a monad, so
this approach does not work, and one has to resort to ad-hoc methods simulating the properties
of a monad (or of a Kleisli tripel).
Preparing for this, we require some properties pertaining to measurability, when dealing with
the composition of distributions when discussing composite games. This will be provided in the
following way. Let H be a measurable subset of $ (X)× [0, 1] indicating a quantitative assessment
of subprobabilities (a typical example could be
{〈µ, q〉 | µ ∈ β(A,q), 0 ≤ q ≤ 1}
for some measurable A ⊆ X). Fix some real q and consider the set
Quantitative
aspect
Hq := {µ | 〈µ, q〉 ∈ H}
of all measures evaluated through q. We ask for all states s such that this set is effective for s.
They should come from a measurable subset of X. It turns out that this is not enough, we also
require the real components being captured through a measurable set as well — after all, the real
component will be used to be averaged, i.e., integrated, over later on, so it should behave decently.
This idea is captured in the following definition.
Definition 8.1 Call a map P : X → FF(X) t-measurable iff {〈s, q〉 | Hq ∈ P(s)} ⊆ X × [0, 1] is
measurable whenever H ⊆ $ (X) × [0, 1] is measurable. A stochastic effectivity function P on a
Stochastic
effectivity
function
measurable space X is a t-measurable map P : X→ FF(X).
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Each stochastic relation gives rise to an effectivity function; this is indicated in the next example.
The converse question, viz., under what conditions a stochastic effectivity function is generated
by a stochastic relation, is more interesting, but a bit more cumbersome to answer. For the sake
of completeness we indicate a characterization in the Appendix, see Section 8.1.
Example 8.2 Let K : X X be a stochastic relation, then
PK(s) := {A ⊆ $ (X) measurable | K(s) ∈ A}
is a stochastic effectivity function. ✌
The next example is a little more sophisticated. It converts a finite transition system over a finite
state space into an effectivity function.
Example 8.3 Let X := {1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N, and take the power set as a σ-algebra. Then
$ (X) can be identified with the compact convex set
Πn := {〈x1, . . . , xn〉 | xi ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}.
Geometrically, Πn is the convex hull of the unit vectors ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; here ei(i) = 1, and ei(j) = 0
if i 6= j is the i-th n-dimensional unit vector. The weak-*-σ-algebra is the Borel-σ-algebra B(Πn)
for the Euclidean topology on Πn.
Assume we have a transition system→X on X, hence a relation →X⊆ X×X. Put succ(s) := {s ′ ∈
X | s →X s ′} as the set of a successor states for state s. Define for s ∈ X the set of weighted
successors
κ(s) := {
∑
s ′∈succ(s) αs ′ · es ′ | Q ∋ αs ′ ≥ 0 for s
′ ∈ succ(s),
∑
s ′∈succ(s) αs ′ = 1}
and the upper closed set
P(s) := {A ∈ B(Πn) | κ(s) ⊆ A}
A set A is in the portfolio for P in state s if A contains all rational distributions on the successor
states. Here we restrict our attention to these rational distributions, which are positive convex
combinations of the unit vectors with rational coefficients.
Then P can be shown to be a stochastic effectivity function on X [9, Example 4.1.14]. Actually, I
don’t know what happens when we admit real coefficients (things may become very complicated,
then, since measurability might get lost). ✌
8.1 Effectivity Functions vs. Stochastic Relations
The tools for investigating the converse to Example 8.2 come from the investigation of deduction
systems for probabilistic logics. In fact, we are given a set of portfolios and want to know under
which conditions this set is generated from a single subprobability. The situation is roughly
similar to the one observed with deduction systems, where a set of formulas is given, and one
wants to know whether this set can be constructed as valid under a suitable model. Because of
the similarity, we may take some inspiration from the work on deduction systems, adapting the
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approach proposed by R. Goldblatt [13]. Goldblatt works with formulas while we are interested
foremost in families of sets; this permits a technically somewhat lighter approach in the present
scenario.
Let S be a measurable space of states; we will deal with the measurable sets A of S explicitly, so
they are no longer swept under the carpet.
We first have a look at a relation R ⊆ [0, 1]×A which models bounding probabilities from below.
Intuitively, 〈r,A〉 ∈ R is intended to characterize the set β(A,≥ r).
Definition 8.4 R ⊆ [0, 1] × A is called a characteristic relation on S iff these conditions are
satisfied
① 〈r,A〉 ∈ R,A ⊆ B
〈r, B〉 ∈ R
② 〈r,A〉 ∈ R, r ≥ s
〈s,A〉 ∈ R
③ 〈r,A〉 /∈ R, 〈s, B〉 /∈ R, r+ s ≤ 1
〈r + s,A ∪ B〉 /∈ R
④ 〈r,A ∪ B〉 ∈ R, 〈s,A ∪ (S \ B)〉 ∈ R, r+ s ≤ 1
〈r+ s,A〉 ∈ R
⑤ 〈r,A〉 ∈ R, r+ s > 1
〈s, S \A〉 /∈ R
⑥ 〈r, ∅〉 ∈ R
r = 0
⑦ A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ . . . , ∀n ∈ N : 〈r,An〉 ∈ R
〈r,
⋂
n≥1An〉 ∈ R
⑧〈1, S〉 ∈ R
The conditions ① and ② make sure that bounding from below is monotone both in its numeric
and in its set valued component. By ③ and ④ we cater for sub- and superadditivity of the
characteristic relation, condition ⑥ sees to the fact that the probability for the impossible event
cannot be bounded from below but through 0, and finally ⑦ makes sure that if the members
of a decreasing sequence of sets are uniformly bounded below, then so is its intersection. These
conditions are adapted from the S-axioms for T-deduction systems in [13, Section 4]. An exception
is ⑦ which is weaker than the Countable Additivity Rule in [13, Definition 4.4]; we do not need
a rule as strong as the latter one because we work with sets, hence we can deal with descending
chains of sets directly.
We show that each characteristic relation defines a probability measure; the proof follows mutatis
mutandis [13, Theorem 5.4].
Proposition 8.5 Let R ⊆ [0, 1] ×A be a characteristic relation on S, and define for A ∈ A
µR(A) := sup{r ∈ [0, 1] | 〈r,A〉 ∈ R}.
Then µR is a probability measure on A. ⊣
Proof 1. ⑥ implies that µR(∅) = 0, and µR is monotone because of ①. It is also clear that
µR(A) ≤ 1 always holds. We obtain from ② that 〈s,A〉 /∈ R, whenever s ≥ r with 〈r,A〉 /∈ R.
Trivially, ⑧ implies that µR(S) = 1.
2. Let A1, A2 ∈ A be arbitrary. Then
µR(A1 ∪A2) ≤ µR(A1) + µR(A2).
In fact, if µR(A1)+µR(A2) < q1+q2 ≤ µR(A1∪A2) with µR(Ai) < qi (i = 1, 2), then 〈qi, Ai〉 /∈ R
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for i = 1, 2. Because q1 +q2 ≤ 1, we obtain from ③ that 〈q1+ q2, A1 ∪A2〉 /∈ R. By ② this yields
µR(A1 ∪A2) < q1 + q2, contradicting the assumption.
3. If A1 and A2 are disjoint, we observe first that µR(A1) + µR(A2) ≤ 1. Assume otherwise that
we can find qi ≤ µR(Ai) for i = 1, 2 with q1 + q2 > 1. Because 〈q1, A1〉 ∈ R we conclude from ⑤
that 〈q2, S \A1〉 /∈ R, hence 〈q2, A2〉 /∈ R by ①, contradicting q2 ≤ µR(A2).
This implies that
µR(A1) + µR(A2) ≤ µR(A1 ∪A2).
Assuming this to be false, we find q1 ≤ µR(A1), q2 ≤ µR(A2) with
µR(A1 ∪A2) < q1 + q2 ≤ µR(A1) + µR(A2).
Because 〈q1, A1〉 ∈ R, we find 〈q1, (A1 ∪ A2) ∩ A1〉 ∈ R, because 〈q2, A2〉 ∈ R we see that
〈q2, (A1 ∪ A2) ∩ (S \ A1)〉 ∈ R (note that (A1 ∪ A2) ∩ A1 = A1 and (A1 ∪ A2) ∩ (S \ A1) = A2,
since A1 ∩A2 = ∅). From ④ we infer that 〈q1+q2, A1 ∪A2〉 ∈ R, so that q1+q2 ≤ µR(A1 ∪A2),
which is a contradiction.
Thus we have shown that µR is additive.
4. From ⑦ it is obvious that
µR(A) = inf
n∈N
µR(An),
whenever A =
⋂
n∈NAn for the decreasing sequence (An)n∈N in A. ⊣
We relate Q ∈ FF(S) to the characteristic relation R on S by comparing β(A,≥ q) ∈ Q with
〈q,A〉 ∈ R by imposing a syntactic and a semantic condition. They will be shown to be equivalent.
Definition 8.6 Q ∈ FF(S) is said to satisfy the characteristic relation R on S (Q ⊢ R) iff we have
〈q,A〉 ∈ R⇔ β(A,≥ q) ∈ Q
for any q ∈ [0, 1] and any A ∈ A.
This is a syntactic notion. Its semantic counterpart reads like this:
Definition 8.7 Q is said to implement µ ∈ $ (S) iff
µ(A) ≥ q⇔ β(A,q) ∈ Q
for any q ∈ [0, 1] and any A ∈ A. We write this as Q |= µ.
Note that Q |= µ and Q |= µ ′ implies
∀A ∈ A∀q ≥ 0 : µ(A) ≥ q⇔ µ ′(A) ≥ q.
Consequently, µ = µ ′, so that the measure implemented by Q is uniquely determined.
We will show now that syntactic and semantic issues are equivalent: Q satisfies a characteristic
relation if and only if it implements the corresponding measure. This will be used in a moment
for a characterization of those game frames which are generated from Kripke frames.
Proposition 8.8 Q ⊢ R iff Q |= µR.
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Proof “Q ⊢ R ⇒ Q |= µR”: Assume that Q ⊢ R holds. It is then immediate that µR(A) ≥ r iff
β(A,≥ r) ∈ Q.
“Q |= µR ⇒ Q ⊢ R”: If Q |= µR for relation R ⊆ [0, 1]×A, we establish that the conditions given
in Definition 8.4 are satisfied [9, Proposition 4.1.23].
1. Let β(A,≥ r) ∈ Q and A ⊆ B, thus µR(A) ≥ r, hence µR(B) ≥ r, which in turn implies
β(B,≥ r) ∈ Q. Hence ① holds. ② is established similarly.
2. If µR(A) < r and µR(B) < s with r+ s ≤ 1, then µR(A ∪ B) = µR(A) + µ(B) − µR(A ∩ B) ≤
µR(A) + µR(B) < r+ s, which implies ③.
3. If µR(A∪B) ≥ r and µR(A∪ (S \B)) ≥ s, then µR(A) = µR(A∪B)+µR(A∪ (S \B)) ≥ r+ s,
hence ④.
4. Assume µR(A) ≥ r and r + s > 1, then µR(S \A) = µR(S) − µR(A) < p, thus ⑤ holds.
5. If µR(∅) ≥ r, then r = 0, yielding ⑥.
6. Finally, if (An)n∈N is decreasing with µR(An) ≥ r for each n ∈ N, then it is plain that
µR(
⋂
n∈NAn) ≥ r. This implies ⑦.
⊣
This permits a complete characterization of those stochastic effectivity functions which are gen-
erated through stochastic relations.
Proposition 8.9 Let P be a stochastic effectivity frame on state space S. Then these conditions
are equivalent
1. There exists a stochastic relation K : S S such that P = PK.
2. R(s) := {〈r,A〉 | β(A,≥ r) ∈ P(s)} defines a characteristic relation on S with P(s) ⊢ R(s) for
each state s ∈ S.
Proof “1 ⇒ 2”: Fix s ∈ S. Because β(A,≥ r) ∈ PK(s) iff K(s)(A) ≥ r, we see that P(s) |= K(s),
hence by Proposition 8.8 P(s) ⊢ R(s).
“2 ⇒ 1”: Define K(s) := µR(s), for s ∈ S, then K(s) is a subprobability measure on A. We show
that K : S S. Let G ⊆ $ (S) be a *-measurable set, then G× [0, 1] ⊆ $ (S)× [0, 1] is measurable,
hence the measurability condition on P yields that
K−1
[
G
]
= {s ∈ S | K(s) ∈ G} = {s ∈ S | G ∈ P(s)}
is a measurable subset of S, because
{〈s, q〉 | (G× [0, 1])q ∈ P(s)} = {s ∈ S | G ∈ P(s)} × [0, 1] ⊆ S× [0, 1] is measurable.
⊣
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8.2 Game Frames
We define game frames similar to Kripke frames as being comprised of a state space and the maps
which indicate the actions to be taken.
Definition 8.10 A game frame G =
(
S, (Pγ)γ∈Γ
)
has a measurable space S of states and a t-
measurable map Pγ : S→ FF(S) for each primitive game γ ∈ Γ . Game frame
Now that we have game frames, we can do some interesting things, e.g., use them for the interpre-
tation of game logics (well, nearly). What we do first is to define recursively a set valued function
ΩG(τ | A,q) with the intention to describe the set of states for which Angel upon playing game τ ΩG(τ | A,q)
has a strategy of reaching a state in set A with probability greater than q. Assume that A ∈ B(S)
is a measurable subset of S, and 0 ≤ q < 1, and define for 0 ≤ k ≤∞
Q(k)(q) := {〈a1, . . . , ak〉 ∈ Q
k | ai ≥ 0 and
k∑
i=1
ai ≤ q}.
as the set of all non-negative rational k-tuples resp. sequences the sum of which does not exceed
q.
➊ Let γ ∈ Γ be a primitive game, then put γ ∈ Γ
ΩG(γ | A,q) := {s ∈ S | β(A,q) ∈ Pγ(s)},
in particular
ΩG(ǫ | A,q) = {s ∈ S | δs(A) ≥ q} = A.
Thus s ∈ ΩG(γ | A,q) iff Angel has β(A,q) in its portfolio when playing γ in state s. This
implies that the set of all state distributions which evaluate at A with a probability greater
than q can be effected by Angel in this situation. If Angel does not play at all, hence if the
game γ equals ǫ, nothing is about to change, which means
ΩG(ǫ | A,q) = {s | δs ∈ β(A,q)} = A,
as expected.
➋ Let τ be a game, then τd
ΩG(τ
d | A,q) := S \ΩG(τ | S \ A,q).
The game is determined, thus Demon can reach a set of states iff Angel does not have a
strategy for reaching the complement. Consequently, upon playing τ in state s, Demon can
reach a state in A with probability greater than q iff Angel cannot reach a state in S \ A
with probability greater q.
Illustrating, let us assume for the moment that Pγ = PKγ , i.e., the special case in which the
effectivity function for the primitive game γ ∈ Γ is generated from a stochastic relation Kγ.
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Then
s ∈ ΩG(γ
d | A,q)⇔ s /∈ ΩG(γ | S \A,q)⇔ Kγ(s)(S \A) ≤ q.
In general,
s ∈ ΩG(γ
d | A,q)⇔ β(S \A,q) /∈ Pγ(s)
for γ ∈ Γ . This is exactly what one would expect in a determined game.
➌ Assume s is a state such that Angel has a strategy for reaching a state in A when playing
the game τ1 ∪ τ2 with probability not greater than q. Then Angel should have a strategy in
s for reaching a state in A when playing game τ1 with probability not greater than a1 and
playing game τ2 with probability not greater than a2 such that a1 + a2 ≤ q. Thus τ1 ∪ τ2
ΩG(τ1 ∪ τ2 | A,q) :=
⋂
a∈Q(2)(q)
(
ΩG(τ1 | A,a1) ∪ΩG(τ2 | A,a2)
)
.
➍ Right distributivity of composition over angelic choice translates to this equation. (τ1 ∪ τ2); τ
ΩG((τ1 ∪ τ2); τ | A,q) := ΩG(τ1; τ ∪ τ2; τ | A,q).
➎ If γ ∈ Γ , put γ; τ
ΩG(γ; τ | A,q) := {s ∈ S | Gτ(A,q) ∈ Pγ(s)},
where
Gτ(A,q) := {µ ∈ $ (S) |
∫1
0
µ(ΩG(τ | A, r)) dr > q}.
Suppose that ΩG(τ | A, r) is already defined for each r ∈ [0, 1] as the set of states for which
Angel has a strategy to effect a state in A through playing τ with probability greater than r.
Given a distribution µ over the states, the integral
∫1
0
µ(ΩG(τ | A, r)) dr is the expected value
for entering a state in A through playing τ for µ. The set Gτ(A,q) collects all distributions
the expected value of which is greater that q. We ask for all states such that Angel has
this set in its portfolio when playing γ in this state. Being able to select this set from the
portfolio means that when playing γ and subsequently τ a state in A may be reached with
probability greater than q.
➏ The transformation for τ∗; τ0 is obtained through a fairly direct translation of assumption ➄.
by repeated application of the rule ➌. for angelic choice: τ∗; τ0
ΩG(τ
∗; τ0 | A,q) :=
⋂
a∈Q(∞)(q)
⋃
n≥0
ΩG(τ
n; τ0 | A,an+1)
with τn := τ; . . . ; τ (n times).
We obtain for state spaces that are closed under the Souslin operations (see Appendix B).
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Proposition 8.11 Assume that the state space is closed under the Souslin operation, then ΩG(τ |
A,q) is a measurable subset of S for all A ⊆ S measurable, for all games τ, and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. ⊣
Note that universally complete measurable spaces or analytic sets, which are popular in some
circles, are closed under this mysterious operation (in fact, you can represent each analytic set in
a Polish space through a Souslin scheme of closed sets [9, Proposition 4.5.6]), but other important
spaces like Polish spaces are not.
Finally, we introduce game models ; they are what you expect. Take a game frame and add for
each primitive formula the set of all states in which it is assumed to be valid.
Definition 8.12 A game model G =
(
S, (Pγ)γ∈Γ , (Vp)p∈Ψ
)
over measurable space S is given by a
game frame
(
S, (Pγ)γ∈Γ
)
, and by a family (Vp)p∈Ψ of sets which assigns to each atomic statement
a measurable set of state space S. We denote the underlying game frame by G as well.
Game
model
Define the validity sets for each formula recursively as follows:
[[⊤]]G := S
[[p]]G := Vp, if p ∈ Ψ
[[ϕ1 ∧ϕ2]]G := [[ϕ1]]G ∩ [[ϕ2]]G
[[〈τ〉qϕ]]G := ΩG([[ϕ]]G | τ, q)
Accordingly, we say that formula ϕ holds in state s (G, s |= ϕ) iff s ∈ [[ϕ]]G .
The definition of [[〈τ〉qϕ]]G has a coalgebraic flavor. Coalgebraic logics define the validity of modal
formulas through special natural transformations (called predicate liftings) associated with the
modalities [17, 23, 6]. You may wish to look up the brief discussion in [9, Section 2.7.3].
Proposition 8.13 If state space S is closed under the Souslin operation, [[ϕ]]G is a measurable
subset for all formulas ϕ. Moreover, {〈s, r〉 | s ∈ [[〈τ〉rϕ]]G } is a measurable subset of S× [0, 1].
This shows that the transformations we consider do not leave the realm of measurability, provided
the space is decent enough.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the formula ϕ. If ϕ = p ∈ Ψ is an atomic proposition,
then the assertion follows from Vp ∈ B(S). The induction step uses Proposition 8.11. ⊣
9 What To Do Next
The next question to discuss would be the expressivity of game models. This is technically some-
what involved, because the base mechanism is not exactly light footed. I refer you to [10]. There
also the relationship to Kripke models is investigated and completely characterized. The bridge to
stochastic nondeterminism through what is called hit measurability from [2] is constructed in [11]
with some new results on bisimilarity.
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A The π-λ-Theorem
The measure theoretic reason why we insist on our modal logics being closed under conjunctions
is Dynkin’s famous π-λ-Theorem:
Theorem A.1 Let P be a family of subsets of of a set S which is closed under finite intersections.
Then σ(P) is the smallest class containing P which is closed under complements and countable
disjoint unions. ⊣
For a proof, see [9, Theorem 1.6.30]. There you find also a discussion on its use, e.g., when
establishing the equality of measures from generators of σ-algebras to the σ-algebra proper.
The application to modal logics is immediate, given that conjunction of formulas translates to the
intersection of the validity sets.
B The Souslin Operation
V∗ denotes for a set V the set of all finite words with letters from V including the empty string
ǫ. Let {As | s ∈ N∗} be a collection of subsets of a set X indexed by all finite sequences of natural
numbers (a Souslin scheme), then the Souslin operation A on this collection is defined as
A
(
{As | s ∈ N
∗}
)
:=
⋃
α∈NN
⋂
n∈N
Aα|n,
where α|n ∈ N∗ is just the word composed from the first n letters of the sequence α. This operation
is intimately connected with the theory of analytic sets [16, 1, 24]. We obtain from [1, Proposition
1.10.5]:
Proposition B.1 If S is a universally complete measurable or an analytic space, then its mea-
surable sets are closed under the operation A. ⊣
A discussion of the Souslin operation together with some technical tools associated with it in given
in [9, Section 4.5].
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